

ADDITIONAL VIEWS BY MR. OBEY

This in many respects is a good bill. It provides the resources necessary to support our fighting men and women in the field in a timely manner. It does so in a way that protects the constitutional responsibilities and prerogatives of the Congress as a coequal branch of the government. Finally, in producing it, the committee rejected efforts to interfere with the President's prerogatives in the execution of foreign policy.

But this bill also represents yet another missed opportunity to address pressing unmet needs for protection of the American people from terrorist attacks. While the committee made some useful improvements in funding homeland security needs within the limits proposed by the White House there are numerous critical needs that should have been addressed and were not.

That is deeply disturbing because it is important that we not only do the right thing in securing the homeland but that we do it in a timely manner. Unless, the funding levels contained in this bill for protecting citizens here at home are increased in the full House or agreed to in conference with the Senate, we will delay for months and perhaps longer the implementation of numerous simple straightforward steps that we should be taking to prevent future catastrophic attacks against the American people.

The amendment that I asked the committee to consider would have added \$2.5 billion in total spending to the bill that was reported, an increase of about 3%. Those funds would have been distributed amongst twenty-one separate programs in which current funding levels will simply not permit government agencies to perform the tasks that our nation's safety requires.

These are some of the issues that the amendment would have addressed:

Stopping Nuclear Materials From Being Smuggled into the United States

While it is unlikely that any terrorist organization has the capacity at this time to attack the United States with a ballistic missile; it is quite likely that a terrorist organization that gained control of a nuclear, chemical or biological weapon could smuggle that weapon into the United States across our Northern or Southern border or by boat. Perhaps the greatest challenge we face is monitoring the more than 20,000 shipping containers that enter the United States each day.

Remarkable new technology allows us to determine if any vessel in a port contains nuclear material through the installation of a single piece of equipment in that port. By placing such equipment in ports overseas we can determine whether or not a vessel is free of nuclear materials before it even leaves for our shores rather than when it has entered a U.S. port. One such piece of equipment is now being deployed by the U.S. Department

of Energy in the Port of Rotterdam, which accounts for the largest percentage of shipments into the United States of any port in the world.

The Department of Energy believes that we could install such equipment in an additional nine ports for the cost of \$135 million. That would provide us with coverage of more than half of all commercial shipping into the United States. It is almost inconceivable that the Congress would reject these funds given the amounts being spent for efforts that provide far less security.

Strengthening Security of our Own Nuclear Materials

Another grave concern is the possibility that terrorists might gain control of nuclear materials stored here in the United States. The Department of Energy, which is responsible for the storage of such materials, has identified security upgrades that it argues are critical for insuring that these materials don't get into the wrong hands. Those upgrades cost \$87 million and are not contained in the bill reported by the committee.

Securing Nuclear Materials Overseas

Russia and a number of other nations have developed the technology to create nuclear materials and weapons but continue to have large amounts of these materials and weapons that are highly vulnerable to theft and resale to terrorists or rogue nations. We have maintained an ongoing program to help the Russians secure their nuclear stockpiles but have not developed similar efforts in other countries.

In addition, nearly every country in the world uses radioactive materials for peaceful purposes including medicine, agricultural research and industrial applications. The possibility of using such materials for construction of a so-called "dirty bomb" makes the development of new worldwide standards for the shipment, securing and disposal of these materials a matter of the highest priority. That effort is not likely to proceed at a rapid pace unless the United States plays a leading role. That job falls to the U.S. Department of Energy but there are no funds appropriated to the Department for that purpose.

The cost of addressing both of these objectives would total only \$18 million.

Providing U.S. Laboratories the Capacity to Cope with a Chemical Weapon Attack

A year ago we passed a supplemental appropriation that provided state public health and environmental laboratories with the funds to develop the capacity to identify the agents used in the event of a biological attack. We have not, however, provided them with the capacity to identify the agents that might be used in the event of a chemical attack. The amendment that was rejected by the committee would have provided \$150 million for that purpose.

Protecting Federal Dams and Waterways from Terrorist Attacks

Numerous communities including some major cities face the prospect of catastrophic damage and loss of life from an attack on federally operated dams and waterways. In addition, attacks against waterways such as the Mississippi River could have immense economic consequences to the entire nation.

Following the events of September 11, 2001, the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Land Management did a specific site-by-site analysis of the vulnerability of such facilities and the cost of installing adequate security to prevent possible attacks. The assessment completed by the Corps of Engineers early last year indicated a need for security upgrades costing \$108 million. That sum was included in the Spring supplemental but vetoed by the President when the bill reached the White House last summer.

Since that time the Bureau of Land Management has completed its vulnerability assessments and has identified security needs totaling \$24 million. The amendment that the committee rejected contained \$132 million to meet the security needs identified by the two agencies.

(See appendix for list of facilities)

Chemical Plant Vulnerability Assessments

Only weeks ago, the General Accounting Office completed a report indicating that a serious threat is posed by the possibility of terrorists targeting U.S. chemical plants. Many such plants are located in dense urban areas and any attack against them could result in catastrophic loss of life. While the responsibility for meeting these security needs lies largely with the corporations that operate the plants, the GAO points out that the federal government at this point has no capacity to determine what security upgrades may be required or whether or not chemical producers are taking appropriate steps to meet such requirements. The amendment that was rejected provided the Environmental Protection Agency with \$75 million to initiate such assessments.

Protecting Imported Food and Medical Equipment

A large portion of the food Americans now eat has at least some component that is imported. Insuring that such food is not health-threatening is an enormous task that is shared by a number of federal agencies. As a result of bipartisan efforts, resources were provided in 2001 to improve FDA's capacity to inspect imported food. But President Bush refused to agree to funding in 2002 to improve USDA's import inspections. That funding was designed to remedy a serious problem that hampers USDA import inspections: the agencies principally responsible for monitoring and inspection do not have effective methods of communicating with one another concerning what inspections have taken place, what the results of those inspections have been or even whether or not certain shipments have been rejected.

We also have very limited capacity for monitoring the safety and possible contamination of imported medical devices. The amendment that was rejected contained \$30 million in funds for the Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Agriculture to address these problems.

Helping Fire, Police and Medical Personnel Help Us

We currently face the prospect across most of the nation that the victims of a chemical, biological or radiological attack could not be assisted by local fire, police and medical personnel simply because those personnel do not have the equipment or training to work in those types of environments. This problem has been widely and repeatedly documented. The Hart-Rudman report recommended that the federal government provide funding to first responders to “immediately clear the backlog of requests for protective gear, training and communications equipment.” The report also concluded “First responders – police, fire and emergency medical personnel – are not prepared for a chemical or biological attack... America’s own ill-prepared response could hurt its people to a much greater extent than any single attack by a terrorist.” States and local governments have documented over \$9 billion in first responder needs that have not yet been met.

The legislation reported by the Committee contains \$2.2 billion for first responders which is available for not only meeting the needs outlined in the Hart-Rudman report but also for paying the enormous overtime costs that communities around the country have faced as a result of meeting the code orange threat level mandates. As a result of providing local governments with the authority to use funds to cover overtime costs, it is very likely that little or any of the funds provided by the committee will be used to meet backlog needs.

The amendment that the committee rejected would have added \$800 million for the equipment and training needed to let local fire, police and medical personnel meet the difficult challenges such an attack would entail. Of this amount, \$350 million would have been provided for interoperable communications equipment, for the police, fire, and emergency response community. Communication problems in disasters have been evident for years: in the Air Florida accident over 20 years ago and more recently in the World Trade Center and Pentagon terrorist attacks, where fire and police from different states could not communicate with each other over their radios. These communication problems hinder the ability of our first responders to effectively respond to a disaster. Only 40% of fire departments can communicate with all of their partners. The National Strategy for Homeland Security calls for improved public safety emergency communications. According to a report issued by the National Task Force on Interoperability, at the state level, replacing basic radio systems for a single public safety agency can cost between \$100 million and \$300 million.

Also part of this \$800 million was \$150 million for firefighter grants, so that that program would be funded in FY 2003 at its authorized level of \$900 million. Firefighter needs are

enormous. A December, 2002, Needs Assessment of the US Fire Service found that: fire departments do not have enough portable radios to equip more than about half of the emergency responders on a shift; the majority of fire department portable radios are not water-resistant, and more than three-quarters lack intrinsic safety in an explosive atmosphere; about one-third of firefighters per shift are not equipped with self-contained breathing apparatus; and nearly half of all fire departments have no map coordinate system.

The last part of the \$800 million was \$300 million for the base Office of Domestic Preparedness program, on top of the \$1 billion appropriated in 2003 and the \$2.2 billion contained in the Republican supplemental bill. Adding \$300 million would take the base ODP program to \$3.5 billion in FY 2003, equal to the original Bush FY 2003 budget request.

Republican members of the Committee argued that no additional funding for first responders was necessary since some funding from previous fiscal years remains unspent. Had they believed that this argument was valid it would be hard to explain why the legislation includes the full \$2 billion in additional funds requested by the President and an additional \$200 million for the program added by the committee. As these members are well aware, the Bush Administration did not distribute the 1999-2002 funds for this program until less than six months ago. The best information available to the committee indicates that the distribution and obligation of these funds is now proceeding rapidly. In addition, the Committee has included in this bill a mandate that states pass 80% of the new funding on to localities within 45 days, so the funds should be spent expeditiously.

Getting More Help from the National Guard and Army Reserves

A critical part of the nation's emergency preparedness has always been our ability to rely on National Guard and Army Reserve units to back up local fire and law enforcement agencies. The need for assistance from such units is obviously much greater today than before September 11th.

Although Congress has authorized "National Guard Civil Support Teams" in all fifty states, funding has been provided for teams in only 32 states. These additional units would be available not only for deployment in the states in which they are located but to meet emergencies in other states as well. The cost of creating, equipping and training such units in the 18 states in which they do not presently exist would be \$160 million.

The Army Reserves maintain emergency/deployable medical facilities and personnel that could be used to respond to disasters created by the use of weapons of mass destruction. Shortfalls in the Army Reserve budget for training and relocating deployable military hospitals currently limit the Reserve's ability to meet this mission. The amendment that was rejected by the Committee contained \$66 million to meet this cost and the \$166 million needed to fund National Guard Civil Support Teams.

Speeding up Proposed Expansion of the Coast Guard

Due to the Coast Guard's significant homeland security and defense role, the Administration asked for \$580 million in supplemental funding and the Committee included \$630 million. The Administration's and the Republicans' supplemental funding for the Coast Guard only funds the Coast Guard's operations in Iraq and in our ports here. None of this funding is for additional staffing or additional security improvements – it's basically for costs related to increased operating tempo through use of the Coast Guard reserves.

The President's FY 2004 budget recognizes the need to increase Coast Guard personnel and provides for an additional 2,000 personnel for half of the year. These personnel could be brought on board October 1 instead of April of next year as the President proposes. The amendment that the committee rejected would have provided \$100 million to allow the Coast Guard to do this.

Additional Coast Guard personnel are sorely needed and should be recruited, trained and placed on duty as quickly as possible. In order to increase its homeland security activities as a result of the increased terrorist threat, the Coast Guard is virtually eliminating many of its other missions. According to the General Accounting Office, the Coast Guard is spending considerably less time on missions outside of the realm of homeland security, such as drug interdiction and fisheries enforcement. The Homeland Security Act calls for traditional Coast Guard missions to be protected as homeland security activities increase – this is not what is happening today and the additional resources needed for homeland security should be appropriated directly, not borrowed from other Coast Guard missions.

The Amendment would have also provided \$90 million to expand port and waterway safety systems (PAWSS) at additional ports. The Coast Guard and the Navy implemented this system recently in the port of Norfolk due to increased threat levels. The Coast Guard should implement this system at other ports. However, current funding will permit at only one additional port, San Diego. The \$90 million contained in the amendment would expand the PAWSS system to the ports of Boston, Charleston, Philadelphia, Jacksonville, Baltimore, Honolulu, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Corpus Christi, San Juan and Wilmington (NC).

Port Security

A major problem that must be addressed if we are to minimize the threat posed by illicit shipments and activities in our ports is greater security in the areas where cargo is loaded off of and on to ships. The Coast Guard has estimated that first year costs for the necessary security upgrades will exceed \$900 million and that \$4.4 billion will be needed over the next ten years. In the current year the Congress has provided only \$400 million to meet these needs despite the fact that local port authorities have made applications for nearly \$1 billion in federal funds.

Ninety-five percent of all non-North American U.S. trade moves by sea and arrives in 361 ports around the nation. Over the past few decades, container traffic and energy imports increasingly have been concentrated in just a handful of ports, making them inviting targets. For instance, 43 percent of all the maritime containers that arrived in the U.S. in 2001 came through the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. As the recent West Coast port closures demonstrated, the cost to the economy of closing these ports totals approximately \$1 billion per day for the first five days, rising exponentially thereafter.

The amendment rejected in Committee would have provided \$250 million for grants to secure ports.

Greater Security for our War Fighters and their Families

The ongoing event in Iraq will probably make all Americans more vulnerable to terrorist attack, at least over the course of the next several years. President Mubarak of Egypt has recently stated that instead of dealing with one Bin Laden we may be facing a hundred such individuals because of the emotions that have been stirred in the Arab world by the Iraq conflict.

It is not unreasonable to expect that some of that anger may be directed against those who have risked the most in this conflict, the war fighters. Yet an assessment of U.S. military installations indicates that force protection and security is well below the levels that it ought to be. The Pentagon has identified more than \$1 billion in unfunded security needs for protecting individual and family housing and other facilities on U.S. military installations.

The amendment that was rejected by the committee would have provided \$197 million to begin reducing that backlog of security needs.

Conclusion

The amendment also contained a number of smaller but nonetheless important items that I don't have the space to discuss in detail. Among these were vulnerability assessments for local drinking water systems; security upgrades for Amtrak tunnels in major East Coast cities; increased security arrangements for the Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln monuments and the Statue of Liberty; improvement of technology for determining the origin of illicit nuclear materials and a small increase for the intelligence budget of the Department of Energy.

As stated at the beginning of these views, the total cost of the Amendment was less than \$2.5 billion. To place that in proportion, it would have increased the size of the supplemental by less than 3%. It was less than 4/5s the size of the unrequested assistance to U.S. airlines which the Speaker directed the Committee to add to the package. It was only about 1/3 the size of the funds provided for payments to foreign countries. When added to the sums for homeland security already contained in the bill reported by the

committee, the total amount for protecting the American people would have been significantly smaller than the sums provided for foreign assistance.

It should also be noted that during the debate on this amendment, I offered to remove any single item that any member of the majority objected to or believed that it did not represent a sufficient priority to be included in the package. I received no suggestions.

The amendment was defeated on a straight party line vote that is listed at the back of this report.

I regret that many of my Republican friends on the Committee felt compelled to vote against what they openly admitted appeared to be common sense steps to reduce the threat and consequences of a terrorist attack because of the demands of Party discipline. In a Congress in which each outcome is predetermined by leadership decisions that take place in advance of formal meeting the role of information and debate in the legislative process becomes minimal.

I find it incredible that those advising the President on these matters have so little sensitivity to the necessity of addressing these problems and that the members of the President's party in Congress seem so incapable of breaking ranks with these decisions even when they openly admit that they are in personal disagreement.

Over time, we have made progress in addressing these needs despite White House intransigence. The problem is that our adversaries are not likely to operate on a timetable that accommodates our slow and inconsistent response. The timeliness with which the funds are provided to the agencies that have responsibility for protecting our own shores is not likely to improve until more people become aware of our continued exposure and the reason appropriate steps are not being taken.

APPENDICES TO THE ADDITIONAL VIEWS BY MR. OBEY

APPENDIX A, TO THE ADDITIONAL
VIEWS BY MR. OBEY

<u>STATE NAME</u>	<u>\$1.5B ODP ALLOCATION IN BILL</u>	<u>ADDITIONAL \$300M FOR ODP INCLUDED IN AMENDMENT</u>
ALABAMA	25.0	5.0
ALASKA	13.2	2.6
ARIZONA	28.0	5.6
ARKANSAS	19.6	3.9
CALIFORNIA	119.3	23.9
COLORADO	25.1	5.0
CONNECTICUT	21.9	4.4
DELAWARE	13.7	2.7
DIST OF COLUMBIA	13.0	2.6
FLORIDA	62.7	12.5
GEORGIA	37.6	7.5
HAWAII	15.1	3.0
IDAHO	15.4	3.1
ILLINOIS	50.0	10.0
INDIANA	30.2	6.0
IOWA	20.3	4.1
KANSAS	19.6	3.9
KENTUCKY	23.8	4.8
LOUISIANA	25.0	5.0
MAINE	15.2	3.0
MARYLAND	28.0	5.6
MASSACHUSETTS	31.0	6.2
MICHIGAN	42.2	8.4
MINNESOTA	26.7	5.3
MISSISSIPPI	20.1	4.0
MISSOURI	28.7	5.7
MONTANA	14.1	2.8
NEBRASKA	16.6	3.3
NEVADA	17.9	3.6
NEW HAMPSHIRE	15.2	3.0
NEW JERSEY	37.7	7.5
NEW MEXICO	16.9	3.4
NEW YORK	70.2	14.0
NORTH CAROLINA	36.8	7.4
NORTH DAKOTA	13.2	2.6
OHIO	46.4	9.3
OKLAHOMA	22.0	4.4
OREGON	22.1	4.4
PENNSYLVANIA	49.2	9.8
RHODE ISLAND	14.5	2.9
SOUTH CAROLINA	23.9	4.8
SOUTH DAKOTA	13.6	2.7
TENNESSEE	29.1	5.8
TEXAS	78.3	15.7
UTAH	18.4	3.7
VERMONT	13.1	2.6
VIRGINIA	33.7	6.7
WASHINGTON	29.9	6.0
WEST VIRGINIA	16.8	3.4
WISCONSIN	28.0	5.6
WYOMING	12.8	2.6
PUERTO RICO	23.1	4.6
VIRGIN ISLANDS	4.1	0.8
AMERICAN SAMOA	3.9	0.8
GUAM	4.2	0.8
NO. MARIANA ISLANDS	4.0	0.8
TOTAL	1,500	300

APPENDIX B, TO THE ADDITIONAL
VIEWS BY MR. OBEY

CORPS OF ENGINEERS -- CIVIL
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, GENERAL
Emergency Supplemental Requirements, Fiscal Year 2003
(Dollars in Thousands)

Dist.	Div.	PWID	Project Name	State	Cost Estimate	REMARKS
SAM	SAD	001680	BWT Rivers	AL	104	Cost increase from revised ESC proposal
SAM	SAD	018070	Tenn Tom Waterway	AL, MS	2,090	Cost increase from revised ESC proposal
MVK	MVD	012180	Narrows Dam / Lake Greeson	AR	62	\$60K Costs to initiate E&D for construction of Physical and Electronic Security Enhancements at the project.
SWL	SWD		Home Land Security-All SWL Projects Arkansas and Missouri	AR MO	3,629	Provide guard services at all projects, regionalization of monitoring of SWL powerhouses and other security needs.
SPN	SPD	004990	Dry Creek (Warm Springs) Lake & Channel	CA	622	Installation of the entire electronic security system for this critical structure to protect against terrorist attack requires these additional funds based on revised Government estimate.
NWO	NWD	003020	Chatfield Lake CO	CO	69	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWO	NWD	003070	Cherry Creek Lake, CO	CO	69	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWO	NWD	072285	Bear Creek Lake, CO	CO	69	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NAE	NAD	081369	STAMFORD HURRICANE BARRIER	CT	424	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
NAE	NAD	081369	COLEBROOK RIVER LAKE DAM	CT	61	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
NAE	NAD	081369	MANSFIELD HOLLOW LAKE DAM	CT	89	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
WAD	NAD	081369	WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT	DC	10,048	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
NAP	NAD	081369	SUMMIT BRIDGE	DE	759	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
SAS	SAD	007380	Hartwell Dam and Lake	GA	255	Guard Services during increased threat levels
SAS	SAD	018530	Richard B. Russell Dam and Lake	GA	137	Guard Services during increased threat levels
SAM	SAD	002190	Buford Dam - Guard Services	GA	50	Additional cost to local law enforcement agreement thru completion of construction 5/03
SAM	SAD	002730	Carters Lake - Guard services	GA	223	Additional cost to local law enforcement agreement thru end of FY 03

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Dist.	Div.	PWID	Project Name	State	Cost Estimate	REMARKS
SAM	SAD	000220	Allatona Lake - Guard Services	GA	149	Additional cost to local law enforcement agreement thru end of FY 03
SAM	SAD	019710	West Point Lake - Guard services	GA	13	Additional cost to local law enforcement agreement thru end of FY 03
SAM	SAD	019190	Walter F. George Lake - Guard services	GA	124	Additional cost for 2 part time security guards and additional patrols for 3 Park rangers thru end of FY 03
SAM	SAD	008450	Jim Woodruff L&D - Guard services	GA	31	Additional cost to local law enforcement agreement thru end of FY 03
SAM	SAD	000410	ACF - George W. Andrews L&D - Guard services	GA	28	Additional cost for additional patrol for 1 Park ranger thru end of FY 03
SAM	SAD	002730	Carters Lake	GA	288	Cost increase from revised ESC proposal
SAM	SAD	019710	West Point Lake	GA	735	Cost increase from revised ESC proposal
SAM	SAD	019190	Walter F George	GA	297	Cost increase from revised ESC proposal
SAS	SAD	003350	J. Strom Thurmond Dam and Lake	GA	415	Security Upgrades.
NWK	NWD	014880	RATHBUN DAM	IA	371	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWK	NWD	014880	RATHBUN DAM	IA	119	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWW	NWD	005090	Dworshak Dam and Reservoir, ID	ID	137	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWW	NWD	010260	Lucky Peak Lake, ID	ID	104	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWW	NWD	005090	Dworshak Dam and Reservoir, ID	ID	274	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWW	NWD	010260	Lucky Peak Lake, ID	ID	207	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWK	NWD	011140	MILFORD DAM	KS	741	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWK	NWD	003480	CLINTON DAM	KS	55	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWK	NWD	011140	MILFORD DAM	KS	84	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWK	NWD	013920	PERRY DAM	KS	112	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWK	NWD	011140	MILFORD DAM	KS	311	CPS
NWK	NWD	008840	H.S.TRUMAN DAM	MO	741	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWK	NWD	017560	STOCKTON	MO	741	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWK	NWD	016980	SMITHVILLE	MO	85	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWK	NWD	017560	STOCKTON	MO	83	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWK	NWD	008840	H.S.TRUMAN DAM	MO	150	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days

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Dist.	Div.	PWID	Project Name	State	Cost Estimate	REMARKS
SAM	SAD	018070	Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway - Guard services for L&Ds	MS	448	Additional cost to local law enforcement agreement thru end of FY 03
NWO	NWD	006230	Ft Peck Dam and Lake	MT	265	Guards at FPCON Delta 30 days
NWO	NWD	006230	Ft Peck Dam and Lake	MT	115	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWO	NWD	006400	Garrison Dam Lake Sakakawea	ND	343	Guards at FPCON Delta 30 days
NWO	NWD	012960	Oahe Dam Lake Oahe ND&SD	ND	343	Guards at FPCON Delta 30 days
NWO	NWD	006400	Garrison Dam Lake Sakakawea	ND	103	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWO	NWD	012960	Oahe Dam Lake Oahe ND&SD	ND	103	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWO	NWD	014120	Pipestem Lake, ND	ND	69	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWO	NWD	006440	Gavins Pt Dam Lewis & Clark Lake	NE	103	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWO	NWD	016010	Salt Creek & Tribs 1958 Act	NE	69	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWP	NWD	080546	Bonneville Lock and Dam, OR & WA	OR	31	Guards at FPCON Delta 30 days
NWP	NWD	008480	John Day Lock and Dam, OR & WA	OR	31	Guards at FPCON Delta 30 days
NWP	NWD	010050	Lookout Point Lake, OR	OR	10	Guards at FPCON Delta 30 days
NWP	NWD	008480	John Day Lock and Dam, OR & WA	OR	202	CPSP cost increase to complete project by 31 Dec 03 (per MG Griffin guidance)
NWP	NWD	010090	Lost Creek Lake, OR	OR	518	CPSP
NWP	NWD	004080	Cougar Lake, OR	OR	518	CPSP
NWP	NWD	007530	Hills Creek Lake, OR	OR	518	CPSP
NWP	NWD	010050	Lookout Point Lake, OR	OR	406	CPSP
NWW	NWD	010920	McNary Lock and Dam, OR and WA	OR, WA	137	Guards at FPCON Delta 30 days
NWW	NWD	010920	McNary Lock and Dam, OR and WA	OR, WA	274	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWW	NWD	010920	McNary Lock and Dam, OR and WA	OR, WA	411	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
SAS	SAD	007380	Clemson Diversion Dams	SC	255	Guard Services during increased threat levels, To be monitored at Hartwell Dam
SAC	SAD	074354	Cooper River, Charleston Harbor	SC	60	Phase II Guard Service. Guards physically on-board on 3/24/03.
NWO	NWD	006270	Ft Randall Dam Lake Francis Case	SD	317	Guards at FPCON Delta 30 days
NWO	NWD	001420	Big Bend Dam Lake Sharpe	SD	103	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days

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Dist.	Div.	PWID	Project Name	State	Cost Estimate	REMARKS
NWO	NWD	006270	Ft Randall Dam Lake Francis Case	SD	103	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWS	NWD		Civil funds needed 306,000/month	VAR	1,903	Guard Costs for FP-Charlie 180 days
NWS	NWD		Guard Costs for FP-Charlie 180 days	VAR	1,903	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWS	NWD	3200	Chief Joseph Dam	WA	16	Guards at FPCON Delta 30 days
NWS	NWD	9400	Lake Washington Ship Canal	WA	93	Guards at FPCON Delta 30 days
NWP	NWD	004400	The Dalles Lock and Dam, WA & OR	WA	31	Guards at FPCON Delta 30 days
NWS	NWD	3200	Chief Joseph Dam	WA	16	Guards at FPCON Delta 30 days
NWP	NWD	004400	The Dalles Lock and Dam, WA & OR	WA	233	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWW	NWD	000608	Ice Harbor Lock and Dam, WA	WA	137	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days

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Dist.	Div.	PWID	Project Name	State	Cost Estimate	REMARKS
NWW	NWD	010210	Lower Monumental Lock and Dam, WA	WA	137	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWW	NWD	009880	Little Goose Lock and Dam, WA	WA	137	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWW	NWD	009881	Lower Granite Lock and Dam, WA	WA	137	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWW	NWD	000608	Ice Harbor Lock and Dam, WA	WA	274	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWW	NWD	010210	Lower Monumental Lock and Dam, WA	WA	274	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWW	NWD	009880	Little Goose Lock and Dam, WA	WA	274	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWW	NWD	009881	Lower Granite Lock and Dam, WA	WA	274	Guards at FPCON Charlie 180 days
NWP	NWD	004400	The Dalles Lock and Dam, WA & OR	WA	1,389	CPSP
LRP	LRD	18730	Tygart Lake Dam	WV	72	E & D Costs to bring security upgrade projects to 35% design
Total Guards					38,314	

CORPS OF ENGINEERS -- CIVIL
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, GENERAL
Emergency Supplemental Requirements, Fiscal Year 2003
(Dollars in Thousands)

Dist.	Div.	PWID	Project Name	State	Cost Estimate	REMARKS
PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES (SOME GUARDS)						
SAM	SAD	008590	Robert F Henry	AL	545 RAM-D 1st round	
SAM	SAD	011230	Millers Ferry	AL	652 RAM-D 1st round	
SAM	SAD	023240	Alabama River - Claiborne L&D	AL	478 RAM-D 1st round	
MVK	MVD	001740	Blakely Mountain Dam / Lake Ouachita	AR	187 \$180K	Shortfall to complete construction of Physical and Electronic Security Enhancements at the project.
MVK	MVD	001740	Blakely Mountain Dam / Lake Ouachita	AR	73 \$70K	This Projects' share of the cost for installing a centralized security monitoring system for dams and power plants at Blakely Mountain, DeGray & Narrows.
MVK	MVD	012180	Narrows Dam / Lake Greeson	AR	73 \$70K	This Projects' share of the cost for installing a centralized security monitoring system for dams and power plants at Blakely Mountain, DeGray & Narrows.
MVK	MVD	036011	DeGray Lake	AR	73 \$70K	This Projects' share of the cost for installing a centralized security monitoring system for dams and power plants at Blakely Mountain, DeGray & Narrows.
MVK	MVD	036011	DeGray Lake	AR	70 \$68K	Costs to initiate E&D for construction of Physical and Electronic Security Enhancements at the project.
SWL	SWD	007070	Greers Ferry Lake	AR	52	Perform engineering and design activities for critical infrastructure security facilities

CORPS OF ENGINEERS -- CIVIL
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, GENERAL
Emergency Supplemental Requirements, Fiscal Year 2003
(Dollars in Thousands)

Dist.	Div.	PWID	Project Name	State	Cost Estimate	REMARKS
SWL	SWD	022480	Dardanelle Lock and Dam	AR	52	Perform engineering and design activities for critical infrastructure security facilities
SWL	SWD	022480	Ozark Lock and Dam	AR	52	Perform engineering and design activities for critical infrastructure security facilities
WAD	NAD	081369	WASHINGTON AQUEDUCT	DC	4,048	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
SAJ	SAD	013240	Okeechobee Waterway	FL	78	Ortona L&D: Upgrade vehicle barriers and gates \$30,000; Ortona L&D Upgrade security fence \$15,000; Moore Haven L&D: upgrade vehicle barriers \$30,000
SAJ	SAD	002860	Central and South Florida	FL	1,667	Herbert Hoover Dike: Upgrade five vehicle gates \$60,000 Herbert Hoover Dike: Pre-position rock for breach repairs \$1,350,000 Port Mayaca L&D : Upgrade vehicle barriers \$30,000 Port Mayaca L&D
SAM	SAD	008450	Jim Woodruff L&D	GA	711	RAM-D 1st round
SAM	SAD	000410	ACF - Andrews L&D	GA	510	RAM-D 1st round
MVR	MVD	003910	*Rock Island District Central Monitoring-multi project-Coralville portion	IA	6	Physical Security Measures
MVR	MVD	015070	*Rock Island District Central Monitoring-multi project-Red Rock portion	IA	6	Physical Security Measures

CORPS OF ENGINEERS -- CIVIL
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, GENERAL
Emergency Supplemental Requirements, Fiscal Year 2003
(Dollars in Thousands)

Dist.	Div.	PWID	Project Name	State	Cost Estimate	REMARKS
MVR	MVD	016510	*Rock Island District Central Monitoring-multi project-Saylorville portion	IA	6	Physical Security Measures
MVR	MVD	015070	Red Rock Dam & Lake Fencing & Barriers	IA	26	Physical barriers required to meet condition Charlie. Timely fund distribution is essential to task completion.
MVR	MVD	016510	Saylorville Dam & Lake Fencing & Barriers	IA	26	Physical barriers required to meet condition Charlie. Timely fund distribution is essential to task completion.
MVR	MVD	003910	Coralville Dam & Lake Fencing & Barriers	IA	26	Physical barriers required to meet condition Charlie. Timely fund distribution is essential to task completion.
MVP	MVD	74295	LOCK & DAM #10	IA / WI	363	FENCES, BARRIERS, GATES, E&D, SA
NWW	NWD	010260	Lucky Peak Lake, ID	ID	518	Engineering and Design funding for Lucky Peak CPSP improvements
LRL	LRD	13200	Smithland Locks & Dam	IL	933	Funds required to complete infrastructure security improvements recommended during comprehensive design charrettes.
MVR	MVD	008010	Illinois Waterway Marseilles L/D	IL	829	Required project funds exceeded RAM-D estimate. Timely fund distribution is essential to task completion.
MVR	MVD	008010	*Rock Island District Central Monitoring-multi project-Illinois WW portion	IL	52	Physical Security Measures

CORPS OF ENGINEERS -- CIVIL
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, GENERAL
Emergency Supplemental Requirements, Fiscal Year 2003
(Dollars in Thousands)

Dist.	Div.	PWID	Project Name	State	Cost Estimate	REMARKS
LRL	LRD	13200	Locks & Dam 53	IL	104	Funds for physical security improvements to meet access control issues at heightened threat levels (fencing, barriers, lighting, etc.).
MVR	MVD	011550	*Rock Island District Central Monitoring- multi project-Mississippi River portion	IL, IA, MO	75	Physical Security Measures
MVR	MVD	011550	Mississippi River L/D 21 Security	IL, MO	518	Required project funds exceeded RAM-D estimate. Timely fund distribution is essential to task completion.
MVR	MVD	011550	Mississippi River Fencing & Barriers at 11 Sites	IL, MO	1,140	Physical barriers required to meet condition Charlie. Timely fund distribution is essential to task completion.
MVS	MVD	011380	Locks #27	IL	1,190	As determined by the 35% review, phase I security work at Locks #27 requires this additional funding above the initial RAM-D estimate.
MVS	MVD	011370	Melvin Price Lock and Dam	IL. & Mo.	664	As determined by the draft 35% review, phase I security work at Melvin Price Lock & Dam requires this additional funding above the original RAM-D estimate.
MVS	MVD	011380	Melvin Price Lock & Dam and Locks 27	IL. & Mo.	513	Centralized Monitoring equipment and contract - All security read outs from the initially funded projects as well as the phase II projects will be centrally monitored from one location.
MVS	MVD	002560	Clarence Cannon Dam	IL. & Mo.	73	Certain security hardware items at unfunded Phase II projects can help increase security until RAM-D funding is approved. Fences, gates, barriers, lights, alarms, and improved communications.
MVS	MVD	002700	Carlyle Lake	IL. & Mo.	73	Certain security hardware items at unfunded Phase II projects can help increase security until RAM-D funding is approved. Fences, gates, barriers, lights, alarms, and improved communications.

CORPS OF ENGINEERS -- CIVIL
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, GENERAL
Emergency Supplemental Requirements, Fiscal Year 2003
(Dollars in Thousands)

Dist.	Div.	PWID	Project Name	State	Cost Estimate	REMARKS
MVS	MVD	016691	Lake Shelbyville	IL. & Mo.	73	Certain security hardware items at unfunded Phase II projects can help increase security until RAM-D funding is approved. Fences, gates, barriers, lights, alarms, and improved communications.
MVS	MVD	015190	Rend Lake	IL. & Mo.	73	Certain security hardware items at unfunded Phase II projects can help increase security until RAM-D funding is approved. Fences, gates, barriers, lights, alarms, and improved communications.
MVS	MVD	019420	Wappapello Lake (MR&T)	IL. & Mo.	62	Certain security hardware items at unfunded Phase II projects can help increase security until RAM-D funding is approved. Fences, gates, barriers, lights, alarms, and improved communications.
MVS	MVD	011370	Lock & Dam 25.	IL. & Mo.	36	Commence design Charettes and Engineering and Design work for the highest priority Phase II Projects
MVS	MVD	011370	Lock & Dam 24.	IL. & Mo.	36	Commence design Charettes and Engineering and Design work for the highest priority Phase II Projects
MVS	MVD	002560	Clarence Cannon Dam/Mark Twain Lake	IL. & Mo.	31	Commence design Charettes and Engineering and Design work for the highest priority Phase II Projects
LRL	LRD	13200	Newburgh Locks & Dam	IN	1,348	Funds required to complete infrastructure security improvements recommended during comprehensive design charrettes.
LRL	LRD	13200	John T. Myers Locks & Dam	IN	1,348	Funds required to complete infrastructure security improvements recommended during comprehensive design charrettes.
SWT	SWD	008530	John Redmond Dam and Reservoir	KS	52	Perform engineering and design activities for critical infrastructure security facilities

CORPS OF ENGINEERS -- CIVIL
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, GENERAL
Emergency Supplemental Requirements, Fiscal Year 2003
(Dollars in Thousands)

Dist.	Div.	PWID	Project Name	State	Cost Estimate	REMARKS
SWT	SWD	005350	El Dorado Lake	KS	52	Perform engineering and design activities for critical infrastructure security facilities
LRL	LRD	13200	Markland Locks & Dam	KY	1,451	Funds required to complete infrastructure security improvements recommended during comprehensive design charrettes.
LRL	LRD	13200	McAlpine Locks & Dam	KY	2,177	Funds required to complete infrastructure security improvements recommended during comprehensive design charrettes.
LRN	LRD	20140	Wolf Creek	KY	62	Additional ITR/PM involvement at 35% and 95% design
LRN	LRD	940	Lake Barkley	KY	62	Additional ITR/PM involvement at 35% and 95% design
LRL	LRD	13200	Regional Monitoring Station	KY	259	Cost to Set Up Central Monitoring Station For LRL. Acquire facility, hardware to set up regional monitoring links.
LRL	LRD	13200	Cannelton Locks & Dam	KY	1,348	Funds required to complete infrastructure security improvements recommended during comprehensive design charrettes. ****If no year end money can get completed. Otherwise will not be able to
LRN	LRD	4390	Dale Hollow	KY/TN	111	Physical Barrier installation
LRN	LRD	4390	Dale Hollow	KY/TN	83	Start and complete Phase 1 documentation for entire 35% package. This will enable District to start 35-95% design first quarter of FY04 and complete construction in FY04

CORPS OF ENGINEERS -- CIVIL
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, GENERAL
Emergency Supplemental Requirements, Fiscal Year 2003
(Dollars in Thousands)

Dist.	Div.	PWID	Project Name	State	Cost Estimate	REMARKS
MVN	MVD	000062	Gulf Intracoastal Waterway	LA	160	Critical Project Security enhancement at Port Allen Lock - Cost above RAM-D estimate
MVN	MVD	000062	Gulf Intracoastal Waterway	LA	731	Critical Project Security enhancement at Algiers Lock - Cost above RAM-D estimate
MVN	MVD	000062	Gulf Intracoastal Waterway	LA	160	Critical Project Security enhancement at Harvey Lock - Cost above RAM-D estimate
MVN	MVD	13300	Old River (MR&T project)	LA	680	Reimbursement for Critical Project Security enhancement at Old River Control Complex
MVN	MVD	13300	Old River (MR&T project)	LA	311	Cost to establish a central monitoring station for security at the Old River Control Complex (Auzillary and Low Sill Control Structure, and Old River Lock)
NAE	NAD	081369	SAGAMORE BRIDGE (CCC)	MA	93	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
NAE	NAD	081369	BOURNE BRIDGE (CCC)	MA	78	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
NAE	NAD	081369	CAPE COD CANAL W/R BRIDGE	MA	813	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
NAE	NAD	081369	NEW BEDFORD HURRICANE BARRIER	MA	148	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D

CORPS OF ENGINEERS -- CIVIL
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, GENERAL
Emergency Supplemental Requirements, Fiscal Year 2003
(Dollars in Thousands)

Dist.	Div.	PWID	Project Name	State	Cost Estimate	REMARKS
NAE	NAD	081369	TULLY LAKE DAM	MA	140	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
NAE	NAD	081369	BARRE FALLS DAM	MA	70	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
NAE	NAD	081369	CONCORD PARK	MA	1,147	79% portion; FACILITY SECURITY
NAP	NAD	081369	C&D CANAL	MD	157	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
LRE	LRD	17380	St Marys River, MI	MI	363	Stiffleg Derrick repairs, used to place stoplogs in Mac Lock when under open flow condition. This derrick is the only way to close the lock in the case of a terrorist attack or other major failure taking out
MVP	MVD	74295	UPPER ST. ANTHONY FALLS LOCK	MN	928	COMPLETE SECURITY SYSTEM PER RAM-D REPORT
MVP	MVD	074295	Central Monitoring Station for the Upper Locks and Dams	MN	778	Establish central monitoring station to cover critical projects located in the upper area of the St. Paul District.
MVP	MVD	74295	LOCK & DAM #1	MN	622	FENCES, BARRIERS, GATES, E&D, SA
MVP	MVD	74295	LOWER ST. ANTHONY FALLS L/D	MN	207	FENCES, BARRIERS, GATES, E&D, SA

CORPS OF ENGINEERS -- CIVIL
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, GENERAL
Emergency Supplemental Requirements, Fiscal Year 2003
(Dollars in Thousands)

Dist.	Div.	PWID	Project Name	State	Cost Estimate	REMARKS
MVP	MVD	15200	PINE RIVER DAM	MN	363 FENCES, BARRIERS, GATES, E&D, SA	
MVP	MVD	13410	ORWELL DAM	MN	259 FENCES, BARRIERS, GATES, E&D, SA	
MVP	MVD	09390	WHITE ROCK DAM / LAKE TRAVERSE	MN	156 FENCES, BARRIERS, GATES, E&D, SA	
MVP	MVD	74295	LOCK & DAM #5	MN / WI	518 FENCES, BARRIERS, GATES, E&D, SA	
MVP	MVD	74295	LOCK & DAM # 7	MN / WI	518 FENCES, BARRIERS, GATES, E&D, SA	
MVP	MVD	74295	LOCK & DAM #2	MN / WI	104 FENCES, BARRIERS, GATES, E&D, SA	
MVP	MVD	74295	LOCK & DAM #3	MN / WI	52 DESIGN CHARRETTE - 35% DESIGN	
MVP	MVD	74295	LOCK & DAM #5	MN / WI	52 DESIGN CHARRETTE - 35% DESIGN	
MVP	MVD	74295	LOCK & DAM #3	MN/WI	156 FENCES, BARRIERS, GATES, E&D, S&A	
MVR	MVD	011550	Mississippi River L/D 22 Security Design	MO, IL	52 Preliminary design for security upgrade. Timely fund distribution is essential to task completion.	
MVR	MVD	011550	Mississippi River L/D 20 Security Design	MO, IL	52 Preliminary design for security upgrade. Timely fund distribution is essential to task completion.	
MVP	MVD	00830	BALDHILL DAM	ND	156 FENCES, BARRIERS, GATES, E&D, SA	
MVP	MVD	07640	HOMME DAM	ND	259 FENCES, BARRIERS, GATES, E&D, SA	

CORPS OF ENGINEERS -- CIVIL
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, GENERAL
Emergency Supplemental Requirements, Fiscal Year 2003
(Dollars in Thousands)

Dist.	Div.	PWID	Project Name	State	Cost Estimate	REMARKS
NWO	NWD	012960	Oahe Dam Lake Oahe ND&SD	ND	2,712	CPSP improvements - Design charrette indicated that initial RAM-D estimate design and associated costs would not provide the level of protection required
NWO	NWD	006440	Gavins Pt Dam Lewis & Clark Lake	NE	518	CPSP improvements
NAE	NAD	081369	SURRY MOUNTAIN LAKE DAM	NH	46	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
NAE	NAD	081369	OTTER BROOK LAKE	NH	69	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
NAE	NAD	081369	FRANKLIN FALLS DAM	NH	51	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
SPA	SPD	003520	Cochiti Dam	NM	1,244	Installation of security upgrades to protect against terrorist threats to our critical facilities.
NAB	NAD	081369	WHITNEY POINT DAM	NY	428	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
LRH	LRD	13,140	Ohio River Locks and Dams (Meldahl, Greenup, RC Byrd)	OH	181	Install perimeter fence to meet minimum physical security requirements of FPCON Charlie
LRH	LRD	13,140	Ohio River Locks and Dams, WV	OH	181	Install perimeter fence to meet minimum physical security
LRH	LRD	13,140	Ohio River Locks and Dams (Willow Island, Racine, Bellville)	OH, WV	156	Bring three FY04-funded critical project security upgrades to 35% design level
LRH	LRD	13,140	Ohio River Locks and Dams, WV	OH, WV	156	Bring three FY04-funded critical project security upgrades to 35% design level
SWT	SWD	015370	Robert S. Kerr Lock and Dam and Reservoirs	OK	1,555	Homeland security - Construct critical infrastructure security measures
SWT	SWD	008990	Keystone Lake	OK	104	Perform engineering and design activities for critical infrastructure security facilities
SWT	SWD	007850	Hulah Lake	OK	52	Perform engineering and design activities for critical infrastructure security facilities
NWP	NWD	080546	Bonneville Lock and Dam, OR & WA	OR	3,744	Physical Security
NWP	NWD	004080	Cougar Lake, OR	OR	207	Advance initiation of design effort in preparation for construction placement in FY04. Facility protection funding is included in the FY04 budget.
NWP	NWD	004690	Detroit Lake, OR	OR	207	Advance initiation of design effort in preparation for construction placement in FY04. Facility protection funding is included in the FY04 budget.

CORPS OF ENGINEERS -- CIVIL
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, GENERAL
Emergency Supplemental Requirements, Fiscal Year 2003
(Dollars in Thousands)

Dist.	Div.	PWID	Project Name	State	Cost Estimate	REMARKS
NWP	NWD	006940	Green Peter-Foster Lakes, OR	OR	207	Advance initiation of design effort in preparation for construction placement in FY04. Facility protection funding is included in the FY04 budget.
NWP	NWD	007530	Hills Creek Lake, OR	OR	207	Advance initiation of design effort in preparation for construction placement in FY04. Facility protection funding is included in the FY04 budget.
NWP	NWD	010090	Lost Creek Lake, OR	OR	207	Advance initiation of design effort in preparation for construction placement in FY04. Facility protection funding is included in the FY04 budget.
NWW	NWD	010920	McNary Lock and Dam, OR and WA	OR, WA	518	Engineering and Design funding for McNary CPSP improvements
LRP	LRD	13180	Emsworth Locks and Dams	PA	935	Difference between approved RAM-D amount and 35% design estimate
LRP	LRD	13180	Regional Monitoring Station	PA	26	Cost to Set Up Central Monitoring Station For LRP
LRP	LRD	NA	PEWARS (Whse. & Repair Sta.)	PA	104	Complete Guard Booth and Install Fence
LRP	LRD	NA	Westview Alternate Commo. Site	PA	156	Fence and Gate to protect this highly sensitive site
NAB	NAD	081369	RAYSTOWN LAKE DAM	PA	1,543	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
NAB	NAD	081369	TIOGA-HAMMOND DAM	PA	1,105	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
NAB	NAD	081369	COWANESQUE DAM	PA	952	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
NAP	NAD	081369	BLUE MARSH LAKE DAM	PA	396	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
LRP	LRD	9050	Kinzua Dam and Allegheny Reservoir	PA	50	E & D Costs to bring security upgrade projects to 35% design
LRP	LRD	Multiple	All 39 LRP Nav. And Flood Control	PA,WV,	2,022	Replace/Repair/Install fence and gates at all sites (\$50k est. avg.
LRP	LRD	13180	Ohio-Allegheny River Area Nav.	PA,WV/O	306	E & D Costs to bring security upgrade projects to 35% design
LRN	LRD	13280	Old Hickory	TN	62	Additional ITR/PM involvement at 35% and 95% design
LRN	LRD	NA	Regional Monitoring Station	TN	259	Cost to Set Up Central Monitoring Station For LRN
LRN	LRD	2840	Center Hill	TN	116	Physical Barrier installation
LRN	LRD	8370	J Percy Priest	TN	241	Physical Barrier installation
LRN	LRD	3940	Cordell Hull	TN	49	Physical Barrier installation
LRN	LRD	9550	Laurel	TN	44	Physical Barrier installation
LRN	LRD	3040	Cheatham	TN	130	Physical Barrier installation
LRN	LRD	2840	Center Hill	TN	83	Start and complete Phase 1 documentation for entire 35% -

CORPS OF ENGINEERS -- CIVIL
OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, GENERAL
Emergency Supplemental Requirements, Fiscal Year 2003
(Dollars in Thousands)

Dist.	Div.	PWID	Project Name	State	Cost Estimate	REMARKS
SWF	SWD	009740	Lewisville Lake	TX	698	Construct critically needed infrastructure security measures. This
NAO	NAD	081369	GREAT BRIDGE BRIDGE (ICW)	VA	18	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
NAO	NAD	081369	DEEP CREEK BRIDGE (ICW)	VA	37	SECURITY UPGRADE PER RAM-D
NWW	NWD	000608	Ice Harbor Lock and Dam, WA	WA	467	Engineering and Design funding for Ice Harbor CPSP
MVP	MVD	48001	EAU GALLE DAM	WI	467	FENCES, BARRIERS, GATES, E&D, SA
MVP	MVD	74295	LOCK & DAM #9	WI / IA	467	FENCES, BARRIERS, GATES, E&D, SA
MVP	MVD	74295	LOCK & DAM # 9	WI / IA	52	DESIGN CHARRETTE - 35% DESIGN
MVP	MVD	74295	LOCK & DAM #8	WI / MN	467	FENCES, BARRIERS, GATES, E&D, SA
MVP	MVD	74295	LOCK & DAM #6	WI / MN	467	FENCES, BARRIERS, GATES, E&D, SA
MVP	MVD	74295	LOCK & DAM #5A	WI / MN	415	FENCES, BARRIERS, GATES, E&D, SA
MVP	MVD	74295	LOCK & DAM #4	WI / MN	415	FENCES, BARRIERS, GATES, E&D, SA
LRH	LRD	8,720	Kanawha River Locks and Dams	WV	4,158	Fully fund security enhancements to FY03-funded Critical Projects
LRH	LRD	013180	Regional Monitoring Station	WV	518	Cost to Set Up Central Monitoring Station For LRH
LRH	LRD	8,720	Kanawha River Locks and Dams	WV	4,158	Fully fund security enhancements to FY03-funded Critical Projects
Total Physical Security Measures (Some					69,542	
GREAND TOTAL FOR FACILITY SECURITY					107,856	
					323,564	

APPENDIX C, TO THE ADDITIONAL VIEWS BY MR. OBEY

DEMOCRATIC SUPPLEMENTAL AMENDMENT

			Total			
Function	Subcommittee	Activity	Request	Manager's Amendment	Democratic Add	Democratic Package
DEFENSE						
DEF	DEF	War needs	62,588	62,464	0	62,464
DEF	DEF	Army National Guard and Reserves	0	0	226	226
DEF	MC	Unfunded anti-terrorism and force protection construction	0	0	197	197
DEF	HS	Coast Guard Iraq operations	400	[400]	0	[400]
DEFENSE TOTAL			62,988	62,464	423	62,887
HOMELAND SECURITY						
Issue voted on in prior bills:						
HOME	AG	FDA medical device and radiological emergency preparedness	0	0	17	17
HOME	AG	FSIS imported food data repository, other	0	0	13	13
HOME	EW	Physical Security at Dams and Waterways	0	0	132	132
HOME	VAHUD	Water systems and chemical plant vulnerability analysis	0	0	100	100
Subtotal, Homeland issues voted on in prior bills			0	0	262	262
Other homeland security issues:						
HOME	CJS	Justice Counterterrorism Fund	500	50	0	50
HOME	CJS	FBI	0	399	0	399
HOME	CJS	PATRIOT Act oversight	0	3	0	3
HOME	CJS	FISA attorneys	0	5	0	5
HOME	CJS	Detention Trustee	0	15	0	15
HOME	CJS	Court security	0	29	0	29
HOME	LEG	Terrorism-related requirements	125	125	0	125
HOME	EW	Nuclear non-proliferation programs	0	0	175	175
HOME	EW	DOE Operations at Higher Threat Levels	0	0	87	87
HOME	EW	Intelligence	0	0	5	5
HOME	HS	Homeland Security Counterterrorism Fund	1,100	0	0	0
HOME	HS	Port of entry and border staffing (including N. Border staffing)	0	293	0	293
HOME	HS	Container security initiative	0	35	0	35
HOME	HS	Airport security enhancements	0	350	0	350
HOME	HS	Homeland Security agencies	0	603	0	603
HOME	HS	Coast Guard	0	0	100	100
HOME	HS	Coast Guard port and waterways safety/security system expansion.....	0	0	90	90
HOME	HS	First responder grants:				
		Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP)	2,000	2,200	300	2,500
		Port security grants	0	40	250	290
		Firefighter assistance grants	0	0	150	150
		Interoperability	0	0	350	350
HOME	INT	Monument security upgrades	0	0	18	18
HOME	INT	Park security	0	0	10	10
HOME	LHHS	Operating funds for smallpox vaccination	0	94	0	94
HOME	LHHS	Compensation for smallpox vaccine injuries	0	50	0	50
HOME	LHHS	CDC infectious diseases (SARS)	0	16	0	16
HOME	LHHS	Upgrading state health lab capacity to deal with chemical terrorism threats	0	0	75	75

Function	Subcommittee	Activity	Request	Total		
				Manager's Amendment	Democratic Add	Democratic Package
HOME	TT	EOP emergency Response Fund	250	0	0	0
HOME	TT	Amtrak tunnel safety and security	0	0	50	50
HOME	VAHUD	VA health care preparedness	0	0	70	70
HOME	VAHUD	Lab improvements to deal with chemical terrorism	0	0	75	75
<i>Subtotal, Homeland issues not voted on in prior bills</i>			3,975	4,307	1,805	6,112
HOMELAND SECURITY TOTAL			3,975	4,307	2,067	6,374
INTERNATIONAL						
INT	CJS	Diplomatic security and consular affairs	101	106	0	106
INT	CJS	Embassy construction	20	72	0	72
INT	CJS	Emergency evacuations	66	66	0	66
INT	CJS	Middle East TV	31	31	0	31
INT	FO	ERMA replenishment	50	80	0	80
INT	FO	Pakistani border security and law enforcement upgrades	25	25	0	25
INT	FO	Colombia -- Andean counterdrug Initiative	34	34	0	34
INT	FO	ESF	2,442	2,342	0	2,342
INT	FO	Military assistance	2,059	2,059	0	2,059
INT	FO	Peacekeeping	200	115	0	115
INT	FO	Emergency Fund for Complex Foreign crises	150	0	0	0
INT	FO	Afghanistan anti-terrorism	28	28	0	28
INT	FO	Child survival and health programs fund reimbursement	40	40	0	40
INT	FO	Disaster assistance	80	160	0	160
INT	FO	USAID	22	23	0	23
INT	FO	Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund	2,443	2,483	0	2,483
INTERNATIONAL TOTAL			7,791	7,664	0	7,664
OTHER						
OTHER	AG	Title II Grants	0	250	0	250
OTHER	AG	Emerson Humanitarian Trust	0	69	0	69
OTHER TOTAL			0	319	0	319
GRAND TOTAL			74,758	74,758	2,490	77,244

DEMOCRATIC SUPPLEMENTAL AMENDMENT

DEFENSE

Defense

- Army National Guard: +\$160.2 million. Congress authorized the establishment of 55 National Guard Civil Support Teams to assist state and local first responders, but only 32 have been created and funded. These teams provide immediate assistance to local authorities especially in cases involving weapons of mass destruction. These funds would cover the start-up costs for 18 additional Civil Support Teams, including additional personnel, equipment, and initial operations.
- Army Reserves: +\$66 million. The Army Reserves will provide emergency/redeployable medical facilities and personnel in cases of disasters created by weapons of mass destruction. Shortfalls in the Army reserve budget for training and relocating deployable military hospitals currently limit the Reserves ability to meet this mission. These additional funds will cover the Reserves WMD training costs.

Military Construction

- Each of the services has submitted to the House Appropriations Committee a detailed listing of unfunded military construction projects that are required to insure the security of our service members and their families as they live and work at military installations located in the United States. These projects tend to be relatively simple upgrades that can be executed within the year that funds are received. The total in this package is \$197 million dollars:
 - The Army: +\$67.5 million for 8 projects going to the Army and the Army Reserve. Gatehouses, fencing and other perimeter improvements make up the bulk of the list.
 - The Marines: + \$10 million needed for a new police station to provide better security on base.

- The Navy: +82 million for 14 projects, which are in their plan for future years but can be put forward now. Typical are projects to increase perimeter security, fencing, guardhouses, and improved lighting.
- The Air Force and Air National Guard: +37 million for 5 projects. These include new fencing, gate improvements, and an entrance complex.

HOMELAND SECURITY

Homeland Security Issue voted on in prior bills:

Agriculture

- FDA: +\$17 million for medical devices and radiological emergency preparedness, including radiological standards, related to radiological health, development work with industry on decontamination devices, safety of imported medical devices. [Funding provided as a contingent emergency in the FY 2002 spring supplemental, but President did not declare the emergency.]
- FSIS: +\$13 million for development of a shared data repository compatible with Customs on imported food, and for other increased foreign food review activities. Consistent with section 332 of the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act of 2002. [Funding provided as a contingent emergency in the FY 2002 spring supplemental, but President did not declare the emergency. Authorized in the Bioterrorism bill that passed House 425-1 and Senate 98-0]

Energy/Water

- +\$132 million for Physical Security at Federal Dams and Navigation Waterways. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Army Corps of Engineers and the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation have been given additional funds for near-term security measures, primarily for more guards and overtime payments and to conduct specific site-by-site vulnerability assessments of their facilities. These agencies have concluded a large number of these assessments, but have few funds in fiscal year 2003 or 2004 to purchase the equipment needed to rectify the problems identified by the assessments.

A terrorist attack on a federal dam could result in a significant loss of life, severe economic disruption, and significant environmental damage. An attack on key commercial locks and waterways could cripple key business sectors of our economy, such as agriculture and

the movement of coal and steel, or flooding in communities such as those along the Mississippi River.

The amendment provides \$132 million, of which \$108 million is for the Army Corps of Engineers – identical to what Congress provided in last summer's supplemental that was rejected by OMB. The other \$24 million is what the Department of Interior needs to protect its dams and facilities, which was not known when we did the supplemental last year.

55 of the Department of Interior's facilities are listed as National Critical Infrastructure. Affected Army Corps facilities include:

Old Hickory Lock & Dam, Tennessee
Chicago Harbor Lock, Illinois
Coralville Project, Iowa
Norrell Lock and Dame, Arkansas
John Redmond Reservoir, Kansas
Lewiston Levees, Idaho
Andrews Lock & Dam, Alabama
Cooper River Rediversion Project, South Carolina
Cochiti Dam, New Mexico
Lake Isabella, California
Gaithright Dam, Virginia

VA/HUD

- Environmental Protection Agency: +\$25 million for a water systems vulnerability analysis. This continues the program begun in the original Homeland Security Supplemental to fund studies of terrorist vulnerability of local water systems. It was funded at \$83 million and included surveys of the largest systems and technical assistance for mid size and small systems. [Funding provided as a contingent emergency in the FY 2002 spring supplemental, but President did not declare the emergency.]

Chemical plant vulnerability assessments -- +\$75 million. According to a GAO March 2003 report, the federal government has not comprehensively assessed the chemical industry's vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks. No federal agency currently monitors or documents the extent to which chemical facilities have implemented security measures. \$75 million would be provided to EPA to assess the vulnerability of those chemical plants within populations of 100,000

or more with worst-case accidental release scenarios. [This part of the proposal has not been voted on previously.]

HOMELAND SECURITY (CONT'D)

Other homeland security issues:

Energy/Water

- Nuclear Non-Proliferation: +\$175 million, including:
 - Nuclear Detectors at Mega Seaports (\$135 million): The global shipping system can deliver a containerized weapon of mass destruction more accurately than a Soviet missile guidance system, according to the Department of Energy. Vessels move 90 percent of our warfighting material, and the bulk of goods our nation purchases from abroad. Current U.S. based systems for detecting radioactive weapons are not oriented toward when a port itself is a target of a weapon of mass destruction.

The Department of Energy has performed an analysis of shipping to the United States, and has identified 60 foreign “mega seaports” overseas where goods/containers from many nations first go before they are shipped to the United States. DOE indicates for example, that about 10 percent of all container shipping to the United States goes through Hong Kong, and about 6 percent each go through Shanghai and Singapore. DOE has developed nuclear detectors that can be given to port authorities in such mega seaports in conjunction with U.S. Customs, which provide port-wide alertment of nuclear material. Detecting and impounding illicit nuclear material before it is even sent to the United States provides the best protection we can get.

DOE is in the process of deploying the first radiological detection system to a foreign mega seaport, but has no funds appropriated in fiscal year 2003 or budgeted in fiscal year 2004 for this purpose. The amendment provides an additional \$135 million protect 9 additional mega seaports, for a total of 10. This would allow screening of approximately half of all containerized shipping entering the country.

- +\$10 million to secure radioactive materials that terrorists could use to construct “dirty bombs”. The use of radioactive materials for peaceful purposes is widespread. They have many beneficial industrial, agricultural, research, and medical applications. On March 11 the Secretary of Energy addressed an International Atomic Energy Agency meeting which he convened to discuss the menace of dirty bombs and the need to recover, account for, store, and dispose of radioactive sources. The Secretary offered the assistance of the U.S. government to representatives of over 100 nations, and my amendment provides him the funds to make good on his offer.
- +\$8 million is to expand non-proliferation to nations other than those of the former Soviet Union.
- +\$8 million is for export control security. The Department of Homeland Security is requesting DOE to provide technical support to preventing brokers, foreign governments, terrorist groups, and criminal groups from trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and their technologies. DOE will provide nuclear WMD training for U.S. export control officials and joint terrorism task forces, provide real-time technical assessments of seized cargo, and assist in conducting outreach visits to U.S. companies that supply materials, equipment, and technologies, that would be of use to terrorists. DOE will also accelerate and augment cooperative programs that assist other nations in improving their domestic export control systems.
- +\$9 million for improved technologies to detect shielded nuclear materials, field improved nuclear detectors for inspectors, and to improve analytical techniques for determining the origin of illicit nuclear materials or devices.
- +\$5 million is enable DOE to provide essential support to post-war Iraq, include assessing and documenting Iraq’s attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction and potentially recovering, packaging, and disposing of vulnerable nuclear materials that may be found in Iraq.

- +\$87 million for Operating Higher Threat Levels. The Department of Energy is operating under a higher security level due to the conflict in Iraq and it needs additional funds to finance the requisite security activities. DOE facilities not only have nuclear weapons, but they also have radioactive, explosive, and other toxic materials that would be of interest to terrorists.

This includes protection to 35 of DOE's world-class science facilities such as the Argonne National Lab in Illinois, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Lawrence Berkely National Laboratory in California, Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, and the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory in New Jersey among others.

It includes protection to DOE nuclear weapons facilities like Pantex Texas (where thousands of nuclear devices are stored), Los Alamos and Sandia National Laboratories in New Mexico, Oak Ridge Tennessee, and others.

It includes the protection to 22 environmental management sites – former nuclear weapons facilities no longer needed once the Cold War ended. This includes sites in Ohio, Colorado, New Mexico, California, New York, Texas, Nevada, Illinois, New York, Kansas, and Arizona.

DOE is also changing its security standards (so-called “Design Basis Threat”) under which its security forces operate. After 9/11, DOE must change its orientation from “preventing theft” to also include “thwarting deliberate attack”. The revised design basis threat will drive up the security requirements, and therefore the security cost, throughout the DOE nuclear complex in science, nuclear weapons, and environmental management of former weapons sites.

- +\$5 million for Intelligence. The Department of Energy has the lead federal role in determining the nuclear weapons capability of other nations, and is also being called on to analyze chemical, biological, and cyber-security issues. Additional funds would provide a robust intelligence capability for monitoring nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction development, and nuclear proliferation throughout the world. The media has reported recently on suspected nuclear activities in North Korea and Iran, for example.

Homeland Security

- Coast Guard -- +\$100 million: Bring 2,000 additional personnel proposed by President Bush for FY 2004 on board immediately and grow the Coast Guard back to the level it was in 1982.
- Coast Guard –Ports and Waterways Safety System -- +\$90 million: This funding would be used to expand the security system currently in Norfolk to 11 additional ports (Boston, Charleston, Philadelphia, Jacksonville, Baltimore, Honolulu, San Francisco, Los Angeles Corpus Christi, San Juan and Wilmington NC).
- First Responder Grants:
 - Office of Domestic Preparedness (ODP): +\$300 million. This funding would be directed to the base ODP program and, when coupled with the FY 2003 enacted funding and the Manager's amendment, would provide a total of \$3.5 billion to ODP in FY 2003. This is equal to the President's original FY 2003 budget request.
 - Port security grants -- +\$250 million. This funding will be used for ports to make facility improvements and conduct vulnerability assessments. The Coast Guard estimates that a total of \$963 million is need in the fist year for facility security improvements. Even with this added funding, only \$690 million will have been provided to date for this purpose.
 - Firefighter Assistance Grants -- +\$150 million. This would bring fire grants up to the \$900 million authorized for this program. A Dec. 2002 Needs Assessment of the US Fire Service found that: overall, fire departments do not have enough portable radios to equip more than about half of the emergency responders on a shift; the majority of fire department portable radios are not water-resistant, and more than 3/5th lack intrinsic safety in an explosive atmosphere, about 1/3 of firefighters per shift are not equipped with self-contained breathing apparatus, only 2/5th of fire

departments can communicate with all of their partners, and nearly half of all fire departments have no map coordinate system.

- Interoperability -- \$350 million. This funding would be for local first responders to purchase equipment so that they can communicate with one another during a disaster. Currently, only 2/5 of fire departments can communicate with all of their partners. Some estimate that as much as \$10 billion is needed to ensure nation-wide interoperability of equipment.

Interior

- National Park Service Construction -- +\$18 million. These funds would support infrastructure security upgrades at the Washington Monument, Jefferson and Lincoln Memorials and other high priority NPS historical parks identified as “national icons”. \$18 million of this is requested in the FY 2004 Budget and the Park Service testified on March 19, 2003 that it expected to have final approval for all projects in D.C. from all planning agencies completed in May. The estimate to do the Washington, Lincoln and Jefferson sites was \$41 million a year ago.
- Department of Interior -- +\$10 million. The Department has continued to accrue extraordinary operating costs as it has maintained high levels of security the National Mall and adjacent sites. This is principally U.S. Park Police and ranger personnel costs. In addition, law enforcement personnel from throughout the Department have provided increased support for security, whether as part of border monitoring or security of facilities such as dams on federally owned property. The Secretary would allocate funds among agencies.

Labor/HHS/Education

- Upgrading capacity of state health labs to deal with chemical terrorism threats -- +\$75 million. These funds would be used by the CDC to help state health laboratories develop capacity to perform rapid analysis of clinical samples to identify the presence of chemical terrorism agents. So far, funding for this purpose has been provided to only five states. These states need additional assistance, many more state labs need to develop this capacity, and CDC needs to

continue development of analytic techniques. The proposal assumes that some of the needed funding could come from the on-going public health preparedness grants, but that supplemental funds should be provided to avoid diverting resources from other pressing needs.

Treasury/Transportation

- Amtrak tunnel safety +\$50 million -- Amtrak has a approximately \$780 million estimated need for life/safety upgrades to tunnels they own that run into and out of New York City, Baltimore and Washington, DC. A potential terrorist action could be catastrophic due to inadequate evacuation shafts, lighting, communications equipment, ventilation and security. We provided \$100 million to get this work started in the FY02 supplemental (and the Long Island Railroad -- which shares use of the NY tunnels -- has already contributed \$220 million).

VA/HUD

- Veterans: +\$70 million for enhancement of emergency preparedness. This amount is to establish, deploy, restock and track Pharmaceutical Caches, provide personal protective equipment, decontamination equipment, and training of VA health care workers.
- EPA: +\$75 million for response to chemical attacks and to strengthen laboratories. Responsibility for responding to chemical attacks is assigned to the EPA under the recent homeland security plan. In addition to building capacity generally within health departments to manage such events, the main need is state laboratory capacity to analyze and respond to purported chemical attacks.